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Abstract
In this paper, I revisit the central trade-off between insurance and incentives
in the design of unemployment insurance policies. The generosity of
unemployment insurance benefits differs not only across countries, but also
across workers within countries. After illustrating some important dimensions
of heterogeneity in a cross-country analysis, I extend the standard Baily–
Chetty formula to identify the key empirical moments and elasticities required
to evaluate the differentiated unemployment policy within a country. I also
review some prior work and aim to provide guidance for future work trying to
inform the design of unemployment policies.
I. Introduction
One of the central adages of the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) is to bring
together theoretical models and empirical analysis to inform policy. Over the
past 50 years, the research on the design of unemployment insurance (UI) has
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slowly adapted this adage, which has resulted in a rich literature that tightly
integrates theory and empirics, and allows for comprehensive, evidence-based
policy evaluations.
It was at the end of the first decade after the IFS was founded that Martin
Baily characterised the central trade-off for UI design in his paper ‘Some
aspects of optimal unemployment insurance’, published in the Journal of
Public Economics in 1978. The trade-off is to provide insurance against the
income loss due to unemployment, while maintaining incentives to reduce
unemployment risk. In this classic paper, Baily emphasised the value that
social insurance can provide, in response to emerging work that warned of
the negative consequences of UI through lower employment incentives and
increased unemployment rates.1 He expressed the trade-off in a simple formula
consisting of few moments, capturing both the consumption smoothing gains
and the unemployment costs of UI. These moments can be readily taken to
the data.
It took another 20 years until the early days of the empirical ‘credibility
revolution’ when Jonathan Gruber was the first to implement the Baily formula
empirically.2 This spurred a significant amount of follow-up work, which
took off further when Raj Chetty demonstrated the theoretical credibility of
Baily’s simple formula ten years later.3 Chetty showed that the moments of
the formula remain the same when enriching the underlying theoretical model.
These moments are often referred to as ‘sufficient statistics’ for the evaluation
of UI policy,4 akin to the elasticity of taxable income for tax policy.
Now, at the 50th anniversary of the IFS, the body of research on UI
and the evaluation of its design, in particular, are impressive.5 Also, Baily’s
formula has been extended and implemented to account for various other
features that take us closer to the real world. This ranges from accounting for
general equilibrium effects6 and behavioural frictions,7 to including informal
sector work,8 allowing for duration-dependence9 and for dynamic selection.10
The work on UI relative to other social insurance programmes is arguably
disproportional to the importance of UI policy as measured by its share
of government expenditures. However, our improved understanding of the
trade-off between insurance and incentives is just as applicable to other social
1Feldstein, 1973, 1974.
2Gruber, 1997.
3Chetty, 2006.
4Chetty, 2009.
5See Chetty and Finkelstein (2013), Tatsiramos and Van Ours (2014) and Schmieder and Von Wachter
(2016) for reviews.
6Landais, Michaillat and Saez, 2018a,b.
7Spinnewijn, 2015.
8Gerard and Gonzaga, 2016.
9Nekoei and Weber, 2017.
10Kolsrud et al., 2018.
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insurance programmes, such as health insurance and social security. The focus
on UI is partly explained by the presence of a tractable workhorse model
(which is arguably lacking for other social insurance programmes) and the
remarkable variation in UI policy and rules, allowing for the estimation of its
causal effects.
Somewhat surprisingly, the evaluation of the specific policy rules used
in the design of UI and resulting differentiation in UI generosity has been
lagging behind. In fact, Martin Baily already acknowledged this omission in
his original article in 1978, stating the following. ‘A compulsory government
program prevents adverse selection from driving out the insurance coverage,
but of course it is still true that when workers are not all alike, some of them have
much more to gain from the program than others, and I am ignoring this.’ A
number of studies have contributed to filling this gap: for example, Shavell and
Weiss (1979), Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), Shimer and Werning (2008),
Kolsrud et al. (2018) and Lindner and Reizer (2018) on the dynamic profile
of benefits; Schmieder, Von Wachter and Bender (2012), Kroft, Lange and
Notowidigdo (2013) and Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2018a,b) on benefits
over the business cycle; and Michelacci and Ruffo (2015) on benefits over the
life cycle. But, overall, understanding the vast differences in UI policies both
across and within countries is an understudied area.
The question about how to optimally differentiate the unemployment policy
– either based on exogenous conditions or on workers’ choices – closely relates
to the question about which tags to use to target social transfers and to improve
redistribution.11 In this paper, I argue that the Baily formula and the sufficient
statistics insights can be valuable to think about the design of differentiated UI.
Thus, the main objective of this paper is to demonstrate the policy relevance
of further research filling this gap in the UI literature, and to provide some
guidance on how to get started.
The first part of the paper illustrates the variation in UI policy rules across
countries and the within-country variation in UI generosity that the policy rules
entail. I draw some key lessons from this institutional analysis. First, the main
dimensions along which the UI generosity differs across different countries are
pre-unemployment earnings and the length of the unemployment spell. Second,
beyond these two dimensions, there are various other rules and conditions that
countries apply. The desirability of these features seems untested, but the
myriad of rules increases the complexity for potential beneficiaries, which
seems undesirable in itself. Finally, as the variation in UI generosity within
countries is substantial, a useful cross-country comparison of overall UI
generosity is difficult. Moreover, a cross-country evaluation of UI generosity
is complicated by the different context and objectives that apply in different
11Akelof, 1978.
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countries, which is less of a constraint for a within-country evaluation of the
differentiated UI policies.
The second part of the paper revisits the trade-off between insurance and
incentives as characterised by Baily (1978), but extending the framework to
evaluate the optimal differentiation of UI policy. This extension builds on
Kolsrud et al. (2018) who study how unemployment benefits should evolve
over the unemployment spells, and it allows for some simple insights. First
and foremost, the respective consumption smoothing gains and unemployment
responses for the groups subject to different UI generosity are key (and
sometimes sufficient) to evaluate the desirability of the differentiation itself.
This highlights the value of further empirical work to estimate heterogeneity in
the insurance gains and incentives, in particular along the particular dimensions
used for the differentiation of UI benefits. The challenge is that the within-
group policy variation required to estimate the relevant moments may not be
readily available. Second, the evaluation is complicated when the eligibility
rules are based on workers’ choices, either directly or indirectly. Examples are
when unemployment benefits are conditional on the time spent unemployed or
the age at the onset of the unemployment spell. In general, it is necessary to
estimate the response in the share of workers eligible to any benefit level to the
specific change in the UI policy. Conveniently, these responses are of second-
order importance when we start from a uniform policy and simply consider in
which direction to differentiate the policy.
I conclude by discussing the empirical implementation of the insurance–
incentive trade-off and I highlight some of the caveats. In particular, the
recommendations on the optimal differentiation across groups can be more
robust and/or less data-demanding than the evaluation of the optimal level
for any given group. I also open the discussion on whether the analysis
can be extended to start thinking beyond the traditional UI programmes that
condition benefit receipt on unemployment so as to provide better protection
against job loss in today’s labour markets. Throughout my discussion, I review
some recent contributions to the literature, but again I refer the interested
reader to the aforementioned reviews for more comprehensive accounts of the
relevant literature.
II. UI design in practice
In this section, I illustrate the substantial variation in UI generosity not only
across, but also within countries. As countries differentiate their UI policies
in very different ways, the protection from which workers can benefit when
unemployed is very different depending on the country and the circumstances
they are in. My focus is primarily on standard UI benefits, designed to (partially)
replace pre-unemployment earnings while unemployed. In many countries,
unemployed workers who are not entitled to (or have exhausted) standard UI
C© 2020 The Author. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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benefits can often rely on what the OECD defines as unemployment assistance
(UA). These transfers are in general less generous and means-tested. I account
for these transfers in the calculations below. Individuals who lose their job or
are out of work can also benefit from other forms of income support or welfare
(e.g., housing benefits, child benefits, food stamps, basic income, etc.), which
are ignored in the calculations. The UI benefits, conditional on unemployment,
can also be complemented with government-mandated severance payments,
conditional on layoff. Severance payments have become more important over
time and are the primary source of insurance against job loss in developing
countries,12 but these are also ignored in the calculations.
I have studied the UI policy rules for 18 countries, which include the United
Kingdom, the United States and Canada, and a large number of European
countries for which data availability and UI policy variation have been used
in recent papers. This includes Austria,13 Germany,14 Hungary,15 Italy16 and
Sweden.17 I also include Japan and South Korea. The only non-OECD country
in the sample is Brazil, for which the UI policy has also been recently studied.18
The approach I take and the assumptions I have made for each country are
explained in detail in the online appendix and the calculations are detailed in
the spreadsheet provided online as supplementary material.
For these 18 different countries, Figure 1 plots the replacement rate at
the start of the unemployment spell for a 35-year-old worker in a household
with an employed partner and one child. The worker earned the respective
country’s average wage prior to unemployment. Large heterogeneity exists
among the different countries, with replacement rates from as low as 0.1 in
the United Kingdom to as high as 0.8 in Switzerland. No country offers full
replacement of pre-unemployment wages for the average worker. There is a
well-known divide in the generosity of social insurance programmes, with
Anglo-Saxon and Eastern European countries on the less generous side of
the benefit spectrum, and Western and Northern European countries on the
more generous side. Asian countries tend to have replacement rates around the
average of the sample, at least for this particular scenario.
A first important determinant of the unemployment benefit level to which
workers are eligible is their earnings pre-unemployment. This is illustrated in
Figure 2. I compare the replacement rates at the start of the unemployment spell
for individuals who, prior to entering unemployment, earned their country’s
average wage (as in Figure 1) and for those who earned only half of that.
12Gerard and Naritomi, 2019.
13Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007; Nekoei and Weber, 2017.
14Schmieder, Von Wachter and Bender, 2016.
15DellaVigna et al., 2017; Lindner and Reizer, 2018.
16Citino, Russ and Scrutinio, 2019.
17Kolsrud et al., 2018; Landais et al., 2017; Landais and Spinnewijn, 2017.
18Gerard and Gonzaga, 2016; Gerard and Naritomi, 2019.
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FIGURE 1
UI replacement rate across countries
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Notes: The figure shows the replacement rate under the same baseline scenario in all 18 countries. I consider
a 35-year-old worker, earning the average wage for the respective country, fully eligible and part of a
household with a partner (also employed at the average wage) and one child. This scenario is changed in
the following figures. Further details are provided in the online appendix.
Note that, in Sweden, the average pre-unemployment wage of unemployed
individuals is almost exactly half the average national wage.19 Most countries
lie below the 45-degree line in Figure 2, meaning that replacement rates tend
to be higher for individuals with lower pre-unemployment wages. Typically,
for those cases, benefits are calculated as a percentage of pre-unemployment
earnings subject to an upper cap, which is binding at the average wage but not at
half of the average wage. In Spain, for example, initial unemployment benefits
are set at 70 per cent of the individual’s pre-unemployment wage, capped at
the monthly amount of 1254.96 euros, which is lower than 70 per cent of the
average wage, but not lower than 70 per cent of half of the average wage. This
results in a replacement rate of less than 70 per cent for individuals whose pre-
unemployment wage was equal to the average wage. A few countries are shown
precisely on the 45-degree line of the graph, meaning that the replacement rate
is the same for the two considered cases of pre-unemployment wage. In those
cases, the benefit cap is typically non-binding even at the average wage. This
is the case for Portugal, where the 65 per cent replacement rate is applied both
19Kolsrud et al., 2018.
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FIGURE 2
Cross-country UI replacement rates by pre-unemployment earnings
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at the average wage and at half of the average wage. For the remainder of the
analysis, I consider individuals who earned half of the national average wage.
A second important dimension along which unemployment benefits vary
is the length of the ongoing unemployment spell. Figure 3 illustrates how
unemployment benefits vary over the course of the unemployment spell,
comparing the replacement rates at the start of the unemployment spell with
those one year into the spell. I consider individuals who contributed to the UI
system for one year, which in many countries is the minimum necessary in
order to be eligible for benefits. In general, benefits decline over the course
of the spell. In fact, in many countries, UI benefits are limited in time and
workers exhaust their UI benefits before one year of unemployment. In the
United States, for example, workers tend to receive UI benefits for only six
months. In several countries, however, workers are eligible to further UA,
typically characterised by smaller amounts, no contribution requirements and
no duration limit. This is the case, for example, in Germany. At the start of
the unemployment spell, a German worker with dependent children has the
right to claim benefits worth 67 per cent of pre-unemployment wage (subject
to a cap that is non-binding here), but after one year such eligibility has
expired. The individual is then eligible for further UA, which comprises
flat payments that amount to less than 67 per cent of pre-unemployment
wage. The UA is often means-tested. For example, in the United Kingdom,
C© 2020 The Author. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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FIGURE 3
Cross-country UI replacement rates by unemployment duration
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unemployed workers exhaust Job Seeker’s Allowance after six months unless
their household income and savings are below specific thresholds.
Figure 4 illustrates how contribution time and age, often interacted, affect
benefits over the course of the unemployment spell. I compare the replacement
rates for unemployed workers who are one year into the spell for two situations:
younger workers who contributed to the UI system for only one year and older
workers who contributed for five years. In certain countries, benefits one
year into the spell are the same in both situations, either because all eligible
payments are exhausted (e.g. Japan and Brazil) or because the worker has
moved away from regular UI benefits into further UA, which does not depend
on age and contribution (e.g. Greece and Austria). However, it is often the
case that older individuals with a longer contribution history can claim higher
benefits in the long run. For example, in Italy, older individuals can receive
regular UI for longer than one year, while younger workers cannot. In Spain, it
is the contribution history that determines the duration of regular UI benefits:
an individual who contributed for five years can claim UI for longer than one
year, while an individual who contributed for only one year moves to less
generous UA before the end of the first year of the unemployment spell.
To further illustrate how the differentiation of the UI policy based on
individual characteristics can vary across countries, I show the UI generosity
in Sweden and Switzerland side-by-side under different scenarios in Figure 5.
C© 2020 The Author. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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FIGURE 4
Cross-country UI replacement rates for long-term unemployed with varying years of
contribution and age
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FIGURE 5
Within-country variation: comparing Switzerland and Sweden
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In both countries, a worker earning half the national average wage, aged 35
with one child, is entitled to the same level of benefits at the start of the
spell (i.e. 80 per cent of the pre-unemployment wage). However, different
individual characteristics have different consequences for the level of benefits
in both countries. For a worker with a pre-unemployment wage equal to the full
national average wage, the replacement rate falls to 50 per cent in Sweden, but
remains at 80 per cent in Switzerland. In both countries, benefits decrease after
one year if the worker has only contributed for one year. However, for older
workers with a longer history of UI contributions, benefits do not decrease after
one year in Switzerland, but they do so in Sweden. In addition, Switzerland
has a child premium, with the replacement rate for a childless worker falling to
70 per cent, while in Sweden the presence of a child does not affect the amount
of benefit.
This brief summary has highlighted some important drivers of variation in
insurance coverage and how their importance differs in different countries,
but this does not do full justice to the often complex myriad of rules
that countries apply and how these rules differ across countries. The UI
generosity is determined not only by earnings and employment history before
unemployment, but also by the type of job separation. In France, the benefits
depend on whether the unemployment spell follows the end of a fixed-term
contract, an individual layoff or an economic layoff. In most countries, only
involuntary unemployment is covered by the UI programme. In Sweden,
however, workers can receive unemployment benefits after voluntarily leaving
a job, but only 50 days after unemployment. Waiting periods are also used for
young workers who have just entered the labour market (e.g. in Belgium).
In addition to the unemployment durations, countries such as Brazil and
Portugal make the level of UI benefits dependent on the number of past
unemployment spells. In the United States, the potential duration of benefits
can be extended for workers when the unemployment rate is high. The effects
of this countercyclical UI policy has been the subject of a recent debate.20
In addition to extra eligibility conditions, there are other transfers than the
unemployment benefits that the unemployed might be eligible for, specifically.
One example is financial aid for housing and utilities, which can be sizeable.
In Germany, for example, a couple with one child can receive up to 562 euros
extra per month.
III. UI design in theory
In this section, I revisit the Baily–Chetty characterisation of optimal UI, but I
allow the UI benefit level to depend on individual characteristics. In the spirit
20Farber and Valletta, 2015; Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis, 2016; Hagedorn, Manovskii and
Mitman, 2015.
C© 2020 The Author. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Trade-off between insurance and incentives 111
of the sufficient statistics approach, the characterisation is a function of a few
high-level moments that can, in principle, be estimated empirically, which is
the topic of the next section. While I touch upon some of the issues here, I
refer the interested reader to Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) and Kleven (2018)
for a more in-depth discussion of the Baily–Chetty formula and the so-called
sufficient statistics approach and its challenges. The extension and notation I
use build on Kolsrud et al. (2018).
1. Set-up
We consider an unemployment policy designed to protect workers against
unemployment risk. The unemployment policy P = {bx}x∈X conditions the UI
benefit level on a vector of characteristics x . This could include the workers’
pre-unemployment earnings, the unemployment duration, the age at the onset
of the spell, macro-economic indicators, etc. A key concern in the design of the
policy is that the share of unemployed workers will depend on the generosity
of the policy and thus will affect the expected cost of the policy. Denoting the
total labour force by L and the share of workers on unemployment benefit bx
by Sx , the government’s budget surplus can be written as
G(P) = [τ¯ −x∈X Sx [bx + τx ]]× L ,(1)
where τ¯ is the average tax in the labour force and τx is the average tax for
workers with characteristics vector x . The fiscal cost of unemployment depends
not only on the UI benefits bx , but also on the foregone tax revenues τx .
It is not only the share of unemployed workers that depends on the policy.
The fact that the variables used to differentiate the policy can be endogenous
to the policy itself matters for the evaluation of a differentiated unemployment
policy. For example, when UI benefits are more generous for higher pre-
unemployment wages, this can affect workers’ incentives to find a high-
wage job. Similarly, when UI benefits are less generous for the long-term
unemployed, this changes workers’ incentives to leave unemployment early in
the spell. Even for seemingly exogenous characteristics, such as age, which is
used to differentiate UI benefits, workers can still manipulate the age at which
they start an unemployment spell.21 That is, when the potential duration of
benefits is longer for older workers, this affects workers’ incentives to delay
the start of an unemployment spell. In general, the share of workers on bx
will depend not only on the efforts of workers’ with characteristics x to avoid
unemployment, but also on workers’ incentives to be eligible for bx . As the
set-up is general, the insights extend beyond the differentiation of standard UI
benefits and can account for other social assistance that unemployed workers
21Doornik, Schoenherr and Skrastins, 2018; Citino, Russ and Scrutinio, 2019.
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can benefit from (e.g. housing benefits) or alternative policies that individuals
who are out of work can consider applying for (e.g. disability benefits or early
retirement benefits).
I assume that workers try to maximise their welfare, given the policy in
place, potentially affecting their unemployment risk and UI benefit eligibility,
and I denote the resulting utility by Vi (P). Social welfare associated with an
unemployment policy P can then be written as
W (P) =
∫
Vi (P)di + λ[G(P)− G¯],(2)
where G¯ is an exogenous revenue constraint and λ equals the marginal cost of
public funds. The policy’s central trade-off is to provide insurance against
unemployment while maintaining incentives to avoid unemployment. The
characterisation naturally extends for general Pareto weights to account for
redistributive motives.
2. Sufficient statics approach
The most powerful idea – but also its strongest limitation – underlying the
sufficient statistics approach is to focus on local deviations from the current
policy. The welfare effects of local deviations are easier to characterise as
we only need to account for the externalities of individuals’ responses to the
policy change, as we discuss below. This can predominantly depend on the
corresponding effect on the government’s budget constraint, which workers do
not internalise. As is well known, local deviations from the current policy can
be considered to test the optimality of the policy in place, as no deviation from
an optimal policy can increase welfare. However, local deviations also allow
us to identify the direction in which a suboptimal policy should be changed
to increase welfare, although an important caveat is that we are restricted to
local recommendations. This can be particularly restrictive when evaluating
multi-dimensional policies: the welfare effect of changing bx may crucially
depend on bx ′ . We would need to embed the approach in a more structural
framework to evaluate big policy reforms or to provide recommendations on
the optimal policy. However, the workings of the structural framework will
depend on model primitives that are harder to identify, leading to a trade-off
between the two approaches.22 The frontier is to leverage the advantages of
both approaches: for example, using the sufficient statistics approach to identify
and estimate the welfare effect of local changes and using the structure of the
model to gauge how this welfare effect would change as we move away from
the current policy.23
22Chetty, 2009.
23Kolsrud et al., 2018.
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a) Local deviations
Consider now an increase in the benefit level bx , keeping all other parts of the
unemployment policy fixed. The total effect on welfare depends on how much
the unemployed who benefit from this increase value it in comparison to its
budgetary cost. This can be expressed as
∂W (P)
∂bx
=
∫
∂Vi (P)
∂bx
di + λ
∂G(P)
∂bx
.(3)
As is well known now in the public finance literature, the welfare effect of a
policy change depends on the agents’ behavioural responses, but only to the
extent that the agents’ behaviour has consequences that they did not internalise
themselves. Indeed, invoking the envelope theorem, agents’ responses to a
policy change will have only a second-order effect on their own welfare
Vi (P).
24 For example, agents can change their job-search strategy in response
to an increase in UI benefits. However, as they were optimising before the
policy change, this response will have a negligible effect on their own welfare.
Similarly, agents can undertake action to become eligible for bx , but because
they were making this trade-off optimally before the policy change, the welfare
effect will be of second order.25 As a consequence, in the absence of other
externalities, we only need to account for the effect of behavioural responses
on the government’s budget G(P) (i.e. the fiscal externality) and the direct
effect of the policy change on agents’ welfare.
b) Value of UI
The direct effect of an increase in bx depends on the agents’ welfare gain from
having the extra resources available when unemployed and eligible for bx . This
gain is fully captured by the marginal utility of consumption v′u(cu) for each
unemployed worker on bx ,∫
∂Vi (P)
∂bx
di = Sx × E[v
′
u(cu)|x].(4)
Clearly, the value of UI will depend on the severity and persistence of
the income shock that unemployed workers are exposed to, and the private
means and social transfers they have access to in order to protect themselves
against such a shock. Both will affect the extent to which workers can smooth
consumption when unemployed. However, the utility gain from the extra dollar
of consumption when unemployed, possibly due to the UI benefit increase, is
24Chetty, 2006.
25Changes in the choice variables might be discontinuous in response to small policy changes. In principle,
one can allow for such discontinuous behavioural responses if they average out when integrating across
heterogeneous individuals so that the social welfare function is differentiable.
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all we need to know to capture the value of UI at the margin. The overall effect
thus simplifies to the share of workers who are unemployed and eligible for bx
and their average marginal utility of consumption. Note that the income shock
due to job loss may well extend beyond the unemployment spell as unemployed
workers may become re-employed at lower wages and in more insecure
jobs. Workers’ consumption as they go in and out of unemployment will
be interdependent. Nevertheless, as UI benefits condition on unemployment,
the workers’ consumption when unemployed is sufficient to determine the
marginal value of these UI benefits.26
c) Cost of UI
Let us now turn to the budgetary effect from an increase in bx . The first effect
from increasing the benefit level is mechanical and again depends on the share
of unemployed workers receiving bx . The second effect is behavioural and
is determined by the corresponding budgetary cost. Conveniently, there is no
need to know any individual responses, as only the aggregate effect on the
government’s budget matters. However, the budget will be affected not only
through the increased unemployment risk in response to the more generous
benefit, but also through the changed eligibility for the different benefit levels.
Hence, we need to know the full vector of elasticities,
εSx ′ ,bx =
∂Sx ′/∂bx
Sx ′/bx
,
which captures the responses of the worker shares on unemployment benefit
bx ′ when changing benefit level bx :
∂G(P)
∂bx
= −Sx −x ′
∂Sx ′
∂bx
(bx ′ + τ )(5)
= −Sx ×
[
1+x ′
Sx ′(bx ′ + τ )
Sxbx
εSx ′ ,bx
]
.
While, in principle, the full set of responses determines the fiscal externality,
the set of economically relevant elasticities can be smaller. Mapping out these
interaction effects and estimating the ones that are relevant will be key to
evaluate a differentiated UI programme.27
26In comparison, the marginal value of severance payments would be determined by the consumption at
layoff, regardless of the unemployment spell that follows, or the marginal value of re-employment bonuses
would be determined by the consumption on re-employment.
27The elasticities are weighted by the relative share of the budget spent on different parts of the
unemployment policy. The budgetary spillover effects of a change in bt on other parts of the policy
are less relevant the less generous these other parts are. There is, however, a correction for the tax rate
because more time spent unemployed also reduces the taxes received from employment.
C© 2020 The Author. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
Trade-off between insurance and incentives 115
d) Uniform policy
I first put together the gain and cost from increasing UI generosity for the
uniform profile bu , allowing the well-known formula in Baily (1978) and
Chetty (2006) to be retrieved. The optimal uniform policy is characterised by
∂W
∂bu
= 0 ⇔
E[v′u(cu)]− λ
λ
=
bu + τu
bu
εSu ,bu .(6)
The left-hand side measures the premium that society is willing to pay, as
expressed by the social welfare function, to transfer an extra dollar to an
unemployed worker. This crucially depends on the difference in marginal
utility of consumption when unemployed and when employed. The more
workers can smooth their consumption when losing their job, the less valuable
UI is. The right-hand side measures the premium society ought to pay
when transferring an extra dollar to the unemployed due to the increase
in unemployment. The higher the elasticity of the unemployment rate, the
more costly UI is. At the optimum, the marginal value and cost of UI should
be equalised.
3. Differentiated unemployment policy
We first generalise the characterisation of the optimal uniform policy to the
optimal differentiated policy when workers have no control over the eligibility
criteria. That is, εSx ′ ,x = 0 for x
′ = x . For each part of the policy, we need
∂W
∂bx
= 0 ⇔
E[v′u(cu)|x]− λ
λ
=
bx + τx
bx
εSx ,bx .(7)
The consumption smoothing gains and the unemployment response among
the group of workers eligible for bx are sufficient to evaluate whether the
benefit level is optimally set. Put differently, for two different groups of
workers, any differentiation of the UI policy is only justified if either the
consumption smoothing gains or the unemployment response is different. The
test for whether UI should be more generous for one group relative to another is
simply whether the consumption smoothing gains relative to the unemployment
cost are higher.
The difference in consumption smoothing gains and unemployment
responses across different groups of unemployed workers remains key when
the unemployment policy is differentiated based on endogenous conditions. To
characterise the optimal differentiated policy, however, we do need to account
for the effect of policy changes across different parts of the differentiated
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policy:
∂W
∂bx
= 0 ⇔
E[v′u(cu)|x]− λ
λ
=
bx + τx
bx
εSx ,bx(8)
+x ′ =x
Sx ′(bx ′ + τx ′)
Sxbx
εSx ′ ,bx .
I provide two examples to shed light on the potential role of these cross-
elasticities.
Consider, first, a two-part benefit policy differentiating the UI benefit level
for two groups of workers (e.g. low-income versus high-income workers,
X = {y < y¯, y ≥ y¯}). The share of workers receiving b<y¯ depends on the
share of low-income workers and the unemployment rate among low-income
workers, S<y¯ = F<y¯U<y¯ . A change in UI for low-income workers has the
following budgetary effect:
∂G(P)
∂b<y¯
= −S<y¯ −
∂S<y¯
∂b<y¯
(b<y¯ + τ<y¯)−
∂S≥y¯
∂b<y¯
(b≥y¯ + τ≥y¯)(9)
∼= −S<y¯ − F<y¯
∂U<y¯
∂b<y¯
(b<y¯ + τ<y¯)−
∂F<y¯
∂bx
U y¯(b≥y¯ − b<y¯).(10)
Here, the approximation relies on the effect of the low-income benefit level
on the high-income unemployment rate being small (∂U≥y¯/∂b<y¯ ≈ 0). We
can obtain a similar expression for b≥y¯ . The endogeneity of the condition
used to differentiate UI requires accounting for the share of workers who may
lower their income to become eligible for the more generous unemployment
benefit level for low-income workers. The fiscal externality depends on the
unemployment rate among these workers at the margin, which I denote
by U y¯ , and the difference in UI generosity on the two parts of the policy.
Importantly, starting from a uniform policy b≥y¯ = b<y¯ , this fiscal externality
becomes of second order, and so even with endogenous conditions, it is only
the unemployment response of the directly affected group that matters when
considering to differentiate the UI generosity of that group. By the same
token, the more differentiated the UI policy, the more important the eligibility
responses are when considering to further differentiate the policy.
Consider now a two-part benefit policy differentiating the UI benefit
level for two parts of the unemployment spell: e.g., the first six months
of unemployment and thereafter, X = {d < d¯, d ≥ d¯}. This is the setting
analysed in Kolsrud et al. (2018). The share of unemployed workers on the
different parts of the UI policy are now directly related as the share of long-
term unemployed depends on the share of short-term unemployed and their
exit rate out of unemployment. More formally, we have Sd+1 = Sd(1− hd),
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where hd is the hazard rate at unemployment duration d. The corresponding
cross-elasticities have been at the heart of the theoretical models used to study
the optimal timing of UI benefits. On the one hand, generous unemployment
benefits at the start of the spell (b<d¯) will discourage workers from finding
employment and affect the share of workers moving on to the second part of
the unemployment policy. On the other hand, generous unemployment benefits
later in the spell (b≥d¯) already reduce the incentives early in the spell for job
seekers who are forward-looking and contemplate the risk of being long-term
unemployed. In addition to the cross-elasticities, there are of course the direct
effects. How responsive are short-term versus long-term unemployed workers
to changes in unemployment benefits? How do these responses compare with
consumption smoothing gains from the short-term and long-term unemployed?
The power of the proposed approach is to capture all the forces together and
turn these questions into empirical ones. In fact, when starting from a flat
benefit profile bu , the characterisation simplifies to
∂W
∂b<d¯
= 0 ⇔
E[v′u(cu)|d < d¯]− λ
λ
=
S<d¯ + S≥d¯
S<d¯
bu + τu
bu
ε[S<d¯+S≥d¯ ],b<d¯ .(11)
The benefit level at a given unemployment duration should be lower, when the
consumption smoothing gains are lower and when the overall unemployment
response to changes in that benefit level is higher, accounting for the share of
workers who are still unemployed at that duration.
IV. From theory to practice
The key advantage of the identified trade-off between incentives and insurance,
following the Baily–Chetty formula, is its potential to be evaluated empirically.
The identified moments have clear empirical counterparts, which make the
link from theory to recommendations very transparent. However, while
the characterisation is general and robust to richer models, the empirical
implementation naturally requires assumptions. These assumptions can be
strong, so it is important, first of all, to be transparent about them. Moreover,
it is valuable to use complementary approaches and data to try to relax
the assumptions or to consider policy recommendations that do not depend
on these assumptions. I discuss this briefly, in the context of differentiated
unemployment policies.
1. Consumption smoothing
The value of higher unemployment benefits to a group of workers depends on
the marginal utility of consumption for that group of workers when they are
unemployed. It is standard in the literature to ignore the redistributive value of
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UI, which would affect the wedge between E[v′u(cu)|x] and the marginal cost
of public funds λ. The focus is instead on the insurance value, comparing the
marginal utility of consumption for a given worker when unemployed versus
employed. At the margin, the insurance value of transferring an additional
dollar from employment to unemployment depends on the drop in consumption
that unemployed workers are exposed to and how much they care about the
variation in consumption. The standard consumption-based approach in the
literature is to estimate the drop in consumption when unemployed and then
to scale the drop in consumption with a risk preference parameter. Indeed,
assuming preferences with constant relative risk aversion γ = −cv′′(c)/v′(c),
the relative difference in marginal utilities simplifies to
v′(cu)− v
′(ce)
v′(ce)
∼= γ
ce − cu
ce
.
Implementing the consumption-based approach is remarkably easy
as it only requires linking data on consumption expenditures to data
on unemployment status. In recent years, more registry-based data on
consumption expenditures have become available, which can also be linked
to employment registers.28 A major advantage for the implementation is that,
in principle, there is no need to know the means that workers use to smooth
their consumption. However, this is conditional on knowing the preference
parameter with which the consumption drop should be scaled. The relevant
preference parameter would depend not only on whether workers’ preferences
over consumption are state-dependent (e.g. through complementarities with
leisure), but also on whether observable consumption expenditures are state-
dependent and affect welfare-relevant consumption differently when employed
and unemployed. This is a specific concern in the context of unemployment
because of differences in work-related or job-search-related expenditures, or
because unemployed workers can substitute towards home production and
shop at lower prices. More generally, the relevant preference parameter will
depend on the type of consumption expenditures that unemployed job seekers
can change. For example, being able to lower expenditures on durable goods
will affect the marginal utility of consumption less,29 while being forced to
lower only non-committed expenditures will affect the marginal utility of
consumption more.30
The challenge of translating consumption wedges into marginal utility
wedges does not disappear when evaluating the optimal differentiation of
a policy, but the nature of the challenge changes. While differences in
28Kolsrud et al., 2018; Gerard and Naritomi, 2019.
29Browning and Leth-Petersen, 2003.
30See Chetty and Szeidl (2007). Also, see Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) and Landais and Spinnewijn
(2017) for a further discussion of the challenges for the consumption-based approach.
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consumption drops across workers with different characteristics may seem
indicative, it is necessary to know how preferences change as well. For
example, to evaluate how high unemployment benefits should be for workers
with low pre-unemployment earnings, we should consider the consumption
drop in this group, but we would also need to know their respective preferences.
In fact, differences in consumption may be more than offset by differences in
preferences, as workers with different preferences will invest differentially in
consumption smoothing.31 However, to evaluate the relative generosity of two
parts of the unemployment policy, we no longer need to know the level of the
preference scalars γx , γx ′ , but it is sufficient to know the relative preferences
γx/γx ′ . In particular, when we know that preferences are comparable (i.e.
γx ≈ γx ′), it becomes sufficient to know the relative drop in consumption.
Kolsrud et al. (2018) find that the consumption drop is more pronounced for
the long-term unemployed than for the short-term unemployed, consistent with
the fact that workers run out of assets as they remain unemployed for longer.
This indicates that the consumption smoothing gains are larger for the long-
term unemployed, unless the workers who select into long-term unemployment
are less averse to the reduced consumption.
It will always be challenging to convert observable responses or wedges
into comparable objects for welfare analysis. The extra challenge in the context
of UI is that coverage is mandated and workers do not directly reveal their
valuation through their coverage choice.32 A number of recent papers in the UI
literature further tackle this challenge by proposing alternative approaches.
In the spirit of the consumption-based approach, it is possible to look at
wedges in resources used when employed and unemployed, such as changes in
spousal labour supply,33 or to consider responses to changes in the anticipated
unemployment risk.34 These responses still need to be scaled by a preference
parameter. A way to circumvent the scaling is to use differences in behavioural
responses to different sources of income variation. Chetty (2008) and Landais
(2015) show how the differential response in unemployment risk to changes
in unemployment benefits, relative to other income changes, can capture
consumption smoothing gains. Landais and Spinnewijn (2017) instead show
how to use the differential marginal propensity to consume when unemployed
and employed, in order to identify the revealed cost of smoothing consumption
so as to bound the value of consumption smoothing.35 Overall, the authors who
31Chetty, 2006; Landais and Spinnewijn, 2017.
32An exception is the UI policy in Scandinavian countries where workers are offered to choose between
basic and more comprehensive coverage (Landais et al., 2017).
33Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019.
34Hendren, 2017.
35Landais and Spinnewijn (2017) also leverage the UI choices in Sweden to obtain revealed-preference
estimates of the value of insurance, and to implement the various approaches in the same context on the
same sample of workers.
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use the alternative approaches suggest that the insurance value of UI is higher
than the consumption-based approach suggests (using ‘standard’ values of risk
aversion). The implied mark-ups that workers are willing to pay to transfer
consumption from employment to unemployment are closer to 100 per cent
and sometimes above, rather than around 10–50 per cent as suggested by the
consumption-based approach. These differences are sizeable, but very little is
known about how the estimated consumption gains differ for different groups.
2. Unemployment response
In comparison with studies of the insurance value, there is a vast body
of literature estimating the labour supply effects of social insurance,36 and
the unemployment responses to changes in UI benefits in particular.37 The
predominant focus in the literature is on the unemployed themselves and how
the unemployment duration changes when varying the benefit level or the
potential duration of benefits. To estimate the effect of UI generosity, it is
common to use exactly the variation that comes from the differentiation in
unemployment benefits (e.g. by pre-unemployment earnings, by contribution
years or by age at layoff).38 Indeed, the differentiated schedules include jumps
or kinks (e.g. at the cut-offs for earnings thresholds or age), providing plausibly
exogenous variation. However, the variation does not allow us to evaluate the
differentiated schedule itself.
Let me illustrate this for a two-part benefit policy differentiating the UI ben-
efit level for low-income versus high-income workers, X = {y < y¯, y ≥ y¯}.
Assume there is a jump in the benefit level from b<y¯ to b≥y¯ at income
threshold y = y¯. A standard approach in the literature39 is to use a regression-
discontinuity design linking the difference in unemployment outcomes just
above and below the income threshold, lim+y→y¯ Uy − lim
−
y→y¯ Uy , to the jump
in the UI benefits at the threshold, b≥y¯ − b<y¯ . To interpret this estimate as
the causal effect of benefits on unemployment for workers at the income
threshold, ∂Uy=y¯/∂by=y¯ , it is necessary that workers around the threshold are
similar, except for the UI benefit for which they are eligible. To gauge this
identifying assumption, a standard check is whether workers are comparable
on observables and whether workers do not change their income in response
to the benefit jump.40
36Krueger and Meyer, 2002.
37Schmieder, Von Wachter and Bender, 2016.
38Card et al. (2015) and Kolsrud et al. (2018) use the kink in the benefit schedule as a function of pre-
unemployment earnings due to a cap on UI benefits. Card, Chetty and Weber (2007) and Schmieder, Von
Wachter and Bender (2012) use jumps in the benefit schedule at the cut-offs for age and contribution years.
39Card, Chetty and Weber, 2007; Schmieder, Von Wachter and Bender, 2012.
40McCrary, 2008.
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The object of the regression-discontinuity design is quite different from
what is needed to evaluate the differentiated policy. First, the response in
earnings to benefit differences below or above an earnings threshold is not a
threat to identification, but one of a response in interest as the corresponding
spillover effects (∂F<y¯/∂b<y¯ and ∂F≥y¯/∂b≥y¯) need to be taken into account.
If there is a non-zero response, it is the average unemployment rate for
the workers who change their income in response to the benefit change
that is relevant, as these responding workers increase the UI expenditures
by b≥y¯ − b<y¯ when they become unemployed.
41 If there is no response, the
evaluation of the differentiated policy simplifies to the standard Baily–Chetty
expression. Second, to evaluate the differentiated policy, the value of knowing
workers behaviour at the threshold (i.e. ∂Uy=y¯/∂by=y¯) is fairly limited. What
we need to know instead is how the unemployment response to benefit differs
for different income groups (∂U<y¯/∂b<y¯ versus ∂U≥y¯/∂b≥y¯). This requires
independent variation in benefits given to low-income workers db<y¯ and high-
income workers db≥y¯ . The jump in the benefit schedule does not provide this
variation.42
In general, variation in the differentiated benefit schedule is hard to come
by. A notable exception is Kolsrud et al. (2018), who exploit variation in
UI benefits, both early in the spell and late in the spell, to evaluate the time
profile of UI benefits. The variation is driven by a cap on unemployment
benefits, which depends on the spell duration and changes over time, providing
independent variation in db<d¯ and db≥d¯ . This allows the estimation of all
relevant cross-elasticities, εSx ′ ,bx for x, x
′ ∈ X = {d < d¯, d ≥ d¯}, to evaluate
the optimal differentiation between the short-term and long-term unemployed.
The large body of empirical literature on the unemployment effects of
UI benefits has provided a wide range of elasticity estimates, ranging from
0.5 to 1.5, by and large. Some of the differences in estimates can be simply
reconciled by the potential duration over which the benefits are changes. The
largest estimates are found when the potential benefit duration is long and the
overall benefit level is increased.43 In the United States, where benefits are
exhausted after six months of unemployment, the responses to variation in
unemployment benefit levels tend to be larger44 than the responses to changes
in the potential duration of benefits.45 This is also consistent with the findings
of Kolsrud et al. (2018), who estimate the incentive costs to be larger for
41An important concern in the presence of selection in a regression-discontinuity design is selection on
treatment (Gerard, Rokkanen and Rothe, 2016), but this is only of second-order importance when evaluating
the budgetary effect of small changes in bx .
42The identification issues here also relate to the distinction between the local average treatment effects,
which the variation in UI policies allows us to estimate, and the heterogeneity in the marginal treatment
effects, which we would need in order to evaluate the heterogeneous responses.
43Card et al., 2015; Kolsrud et al., 2018.
44Meyer, 1990; Landais, 2015.
45Rothstein, 2011; Farber and Valletta, 2015.
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UI benefits paid to the short-term unemployed compared with those paid to
the long-term unemployed. This difference holds despite the forward-looking
response by the short-term unemployed to changes in UI benefits when long-
term unemployed.
a) Differentiated unemployment policy
Putting the estimates of the insurance value and incentive costs together, we
should be able to conclude whether UI benefits are too high or too low,
but reaching consensus can be challenging. Compared with the traditional
consumption-based estimates of the insurance gains, even the low-range
estimates of the incentive costs imply that UI would be too generous overall.
However, the more recent estimates on the insurance gains indicate that even
for high incentives costs, a further increase in generosity may be desirable.
Linking this back to the dimensions of policy differentiation discussed
in Section II, it is also crucial to get a better understanding of the
heterogeneity in consumption smoothing gains and unemployment responses.
We currently have very little evidence on the corresponding heterogeneity
by pre-unemployment earnings, by pre-unemployment history, by age and
by available means, which are all common dimensions across which UI
generosity differs.46 Moreover, we would need to systematically compare the
heterogeneity in effects with the eligibility responses to the differentiation in
the policy itself.
The evidence in Kolsrud et al. (2018) allows us to evaluate the optimal
differentiation by unemployment duration and illustrates that the challenges
for drawing conclusions on the optimal differentiation are different from the
challenges for pinning down the optimal level. In particular, as the incentive
costs are larger for UI benefits paid to the short-term unemployed, while
the consumption drops are more pronounced for the long-term unemployed,
the robust conclusion is that benefits should be higher for the long-term
unemployed, unless the long-term unemployed have very different preferences
(or are assigned different social welfare weights). This is still a local
recommendation, but it does not rely on whether UI benefits are too
high or too low, on average. Hopefully, future research can identify other
significant dimensions of heterogeneity and shed further light on the optimal
differentiation of UI.
46Landais and Spinnewijn (2017) document some observable heterogeneity in the consumption drops and
the value of UI as revealed by workers’ UI choices. The correlation in the heterogeneity in both measures
is often insignificant or even negative, indicating the potential importance of heterogeneity in preferences
or the confounding role played by frictions underlying choices.
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V. Discussion
A central challenge in the design of UI is to protect workers against
unemployment risk while providing incentives to reduce unemployment risk.
In practice, countries provide different protection to workers with different
characteristics or employment histories. This differentiation of UI could be
evaluated according to the same trade-off, where the UI generosity should be
higher for workers who value insurance more or for whom the incentive cost
is lower. The benefit from differentiating the generosity will be higher when
there is more heterogeneity in valuation relative to cost, assuming that workers
have limited ability to change their eligibility status. More empirical work is
needed to evaluate the current differentiation in UI benefits – in particular, the
differentiation by unemployment duration and by pre-unemployment earnings.
However, we should also go a step further to uncover key dimensions of
heterogeneity in welfare effects that are currently ignored in UI policies. For
example, unemployment benefits might be better targeted when conditioning
on the unemployment history rather than just on the length of the ongoing
unemployment spell.
While this discussion has focused on standard UI, the evaluation could be
extended to other unemployment policies. As mentioned before, severance
pay – only conditioning on layoff – is relatively more common in developing
countries.47 It is possible to compare the insurance loss with the incentive
gain from such transfers – unconditional on being unemployed. Private
UI savings accounts are a related policy, further reducing incentive costs,
but still providing access to liquidity upon layoff. In general, the need for
protection against the consequences of job loss may extend beyond the
initial unemployment spell, as evidenced by the long-lasting effect of job
loss on earnings48 and consumption.49 This may call for more targeted policy
instruments such as wage insurance.
In principle, heterogeneity in valuations could also be accommodated by
offering workers the choice over how much UI coverage to get. However,
realising these gains is not obvious when workers also differ in costs due to
adverse selection or when their choices are subject to behavioural frictions.50
With the exception of some of the Scandinavian countries, in all countries, the
UI coverage is pre-determined, leaving no choice to the worker.
Just as in most of the UI literature, I have restricted my analysis of
the gains and costs of UI to the insurance value and the incentive cost,
respectively. In practice, UI can be used for fiscal stabilisation51 and to
47Gerard and Naritomi, 2019.
48Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993.
49Landais and Spinnewijn, 2017.
50Landais et al., 2017; Landais and Spinnewijn, 2017.
51Kekre, 2017.
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stimulate consumption.52 The general equilibrium effects may be different
from the partial unemployment responses, which affects the characterisation
of the optimal trade-off.53 In order to evaluate the optimal differentiation
of UI, the question becomes whether these general equilibrium effects are
different for the unemployment benefits paid to different groups. My discussion
has also overlooked the role of behavioural frictions, although they are
shown to be important for both workers’ job-search decisions and their
consumption smoothing. Examples are reference-dependence,54 impatience,
excess sensitivity55 and/or biased beliefs.56 When evaluating different types of
unemployment policies, it is crucial to understand how they affect workers’
exposure to these biases. When comparing how desirable a policy is for
different groups of workers, only the relative incidence of these biases will
be important. So, even when accounting for these additional effects, a robust
evaluation of the differential protection embedded in the differentiated UI
policies seems valuable and feasible.
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